Shattering the Speedy Hesalite Apollo / NASA selection myth (maybe)

[cvalue13]

See at bottom an extract from the 1964 memo specifying that the chronograph crystal be shatterproof, as well as the Omega invoice to NASA responsive to the statement of specifications.

Omegafanman

this has also got me wondering if they did anything special for the cameras

The same engineer, Regan, responsible for chronograph selection, was responsible also for camera selection.

Omegafanman

Some of the items found after Neil Armstrong died also look like they had glass elements ..

I don’t think anyone is saying they didn’t have glass instruments or articles on board. They did, and still do to this day. The question instead is relevance of that fact.

The reason I posted the more contemporary white paper of NASA and ISS safety regulations regarding frangible materials was to show the sort of cost-benefit analysis going into the allowances for frangible materials. Glass is avoided where practical, and where unavoidable (eg optical glass, computer and TV monitors, research equipment, etc.), then additional storage, containment, and usage precautions are implemented.

Your showing of the Armstrong optic glass (cameras) is a great example of this: the ISS safety regs have an entire section specifically dealing with procedures around optic glass; unlike a watch crystal, optical glass is a materials selection instance where glass is necessary, and so there are additional safety reqs and procedures around the existence of optical glass in the vehicle.

Point being: it seems uncontroversially true that there was glass on board then and now, and at the same time that seems irrelevant to any conclusion regarding the requirement for a “shatterproof” crystal on the chronograph selected (which requirement was explicitly in the period correct statement of specs). Unlike accepting the risk of optic glass on board, there was no sufficient reason to not require a shatterproof crystal.

Which is why NASA specified the need for a shatterproof crystal in the 1964 memorandum that went out to manufacturers:

 

[cvalue13]

For fun, here’s a video of Regan discussing the procurement, specification, testing, and later modification of the chronographs to be used.

About midway he discusses the procurement specifications issued to 10 manufactures, but - and this is the first I’ve heard of this - also published in the U.S. Government’s “commerce business daily” for putting all manufacturers on notice of a Government procurement.

https://monochrome-watches.com/the-...n-former-nasa-engineer-responsible-moonwatch/

Omegafanman

I think they just bought the watches off the shelf for the tests and an official order was placed after the testing and selection process.

Note that this is an old and debunked myth, which Regan and others have long since and directly disputed (in the above video he touches on it, more indirectly) in various other written interviews.

The myth was seemingly given some traction by a parallel set of facts: during mercury, two astronauts had on their own accord purchased and used Speedmasters; later, during Gemini, the official NASA/government procurement process occurred prior to any testing or ultimate choice of watch.

Here, also just or fun, is the letter from Deke Slayton officially requesting an issued chronograph for the Gemini program.





Then here, also for fun, are the reported results and recommendations to officially select the Speedmaster for government procurement (which btw is also the famous document that describes how the astronauts wanted to replace the tachy bezel with a more useful bezel - which point @SpeedyPhill Is keen to see honored by Omega one day).




There’s one more, probably interesting, document relevant to the topic of crystal selection; this document is associated with the early formulation of the specifications for a chronograph suitable to the program, that is hard to read - but appears to in at least 3 places touch upon the issue of the crystal and breakage of the crystal. I might try some enhancements to see if it becomes any more legible but posting here in its current photocopied state of glark

 

[Omegafanman]

There’s one more, probably interesting, document relevant to the topic of crystal selection; this document is associated with the early formulation of the specifications for a chronograph suitable to the program, that is hard to read - but appears to in at least 3 places touch upon the issue of the crystal and breakage of the crystal. I might try some enhancements to see if it becomes any more legible but posting here in its current photocopied state of glark


[/QUOTE]

Thanks for all the above info - that is indeed more than a smoking gun pointing to a shatterproof requirement in the sixties. It also fills in a lot of gaps regarding the procurement process. It will be nice to see a better version / transcribed version of the specification planning notes. It is still interesting there was no physical impact test on the crystal.

I guess that leaves an open question regarding sapphire crystal. If all the watches were plastic crystal off the shelf (mainly due to its common use at the time) how would a modern Sapphire crystal option have been treated. The crew isolation requirements reduced with experience as the risk was assessed after each mission and in the opposite way instrument protection increased after the Apollo 15 breakage - so things did and do of course evolve.

It is a fact that the X-33 is sapphire crystal and a lot of personal choice sapphire crystal watches have now been flown (including an EVA with the Panerai). That makes me think it is not seen as a significant risk and the additional strength and resilience of the modern material wins out on the risk/benefit analysis- If the failure mode was a strong concern they would be prohibited ?
I suppose that is the reason why better quality watches all adopted sapphire crystal from the late sixties onwards and it is now the de facto choice.

Thanks again for all the great info and research

 

[cvalue13]

Some points of addition or just chatting, below

Omegafanman

I guess that leaves an open question regarding sapphire crystal. If all the watches were plastic crystal off the shelf (mainly due to its common use at the time) how would a modern Sapphire crystal option have been treated.

Well, here’s the interesting thing about Regan’s reference in the video to the public notice posted at the same time in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) (a government printed periodical that listed notices of proposed government procurement actions, contract awards, sales of government property, and other procurement information). In retrospect, it stands to reason (based on my limited knowledge of government contracting and procurement) that NASA could not select *only* the 10 manufactures mentioned in the procurement memo, but would instead have to check the box of a public notice to *any* manufacturer.

(I’ve just gotten off the phone with my regional government document reference librarian, who is off to try and help me determine how to search for the ~1963-1965 CHD periodicals, in an effort to find the listing from NASA for this procurement.)

Point being, while the internal memorandum recommended that 10 specific manufactures be contacted, the CBD would have theoretically permitted of any manufacturer to submit for consideration.




There were in 1964 certainly manufacturers of “sports” watches using sapphire crystals. Whether any manufacturer on the list above, or otherwise, we’re using a sapphire crystal on a chronograph I’m unsure.

But back to the procurement specifications perspective: it’s doubtful that the engineers drafting the specifications knew of the off-the-shelf offerings of the listed manufacturers, or any other that may respond to the CBD notice.

Omegafanman

It is a fact that the X-33 is sapphire crystal and a lot of personal choice sapphire crystal watches have now been flown (including an EVA with the Panerai).

But there still even today remains an important distinction between what has been government-issued (vs a personal item), and also what has been approved by the government for IVA vs EVA. The X-33 is only approved for IVA (though primarily due, presumably, to the inability of the battery/displays to survive in EVA conditions - I guess we’ll never know if the X-33s sapphire crystal plays any additional role in decisions today).

Many, many, personal watches with sapphire-crystal have been worn in IVA. And, I think there are several known or watches with sapphire crystals suspected to have been worn under the suit on EVAs.

I can’t speak or course for what Roscosmos did or didn’t know/approve when Shkaplerov wore the Panerai, above the suit, on an EVA.

One more point, getting back however to the minds of materials selection engineers in 1964:

Something worth keeping in mind is that the early procurement exercises were not performed under an assumption that manufacturers would provide off-the-shelf models. It turned out that way, but seemingly by some happenstance.

If the original procurement rational documents and then also the results documents are reviewed, there was the potential for a far more purpose-built approach to the chronograph to be issued.

In the procurement rational docs, there is mention, essentially, that “let’s see what manufacturers will provide since we don’t really have time to build something from scratch ourselves.”

Then, in the results documents, there are the famous notes about how, essentially, “we don’t really have time before the mission to ask the manufacturer to make the various changes we want, so for now we’ll need to just go off the shelf.”

Indeed, in later iterations NASA did ask for and receive (either by happenstance or design) various changes made to the Speedmaster. (In the video posted above, for example, Regan talks about how the astronauts kept bending and breaking the chrono pushers, and so he went to Omega to ask them to do something to fix this only to find out that Omega was already independently developing the asymmetrical case to resolve just this issue).

Collectively, this is all to say: the specifications being submitted for the selection of a chronograph were not assuming that NASA should or would be using a standard off-the-shelf model, but instead allowing or possibly even encouraging manufacturers to provide watches fit for purpose - so long as they adhered to the specifications.

As it turns out, but only by happenstance, time did not it seems allow any manufacturer to submit a specialty model, nor did time permit NASA to make the improvements they (and the astronauts) wanted to the Speedmaster, so an off-the-shelf watch was ultimately used by happenstance (at first).

So, the statement of specifications regarding being “shatterproof” was not merely redundant to the fact that watches submitted happened to have plexi crystals, but instead was intended as an actual boundary specification.

 

[Omegafanman]

cvalue13

Some points of addition or just chatting, below

So, the statement of specifications regarding being “shatterproof” was not merely redundant to the fact that watches submitted happened to have plexi crystals, but instead was intended as an actual boundary specification.

Based on the evidence you have provided so far I am minded to agree with you that shatterproof was indeed a boundary specification for the Apollo mission NASA approved watches. It will be great if you can find any of the newspaper published tender invitations. I am also a little confused by the wording and qtys on the PO (2 or 12 and 12 at the same price but different brands?) Also a transcript of that pre-spec discussion document would be nice as I am struggling to make that out.

As already mentioned I am interested how that specific need / perceived risk mitigation evolved given that Sapphire glass watches are now common place for IVA (and the odd sneaky EVA :0)
I am also not sure why plastic crystal would be a strong demand for EVA when compared to the risks of glass shards inside the vehicle.
That leads me back to the X-33. It would be very interesting to locate the test specifications for that and any reference to the sapphire crystal. I am not aware of any instances of a sapphire crystal shattering on a mission and in terms of general performance it is clearly the preferred material for most modern watches due to its scratch resistance and optical qualities etc
It’s a shame they did not develop a test for that element so we could retrospectively trial a Sapphire version.

 

[cvalue13]

Omegafanman

I am also not sure why plastic crystal would be a strong demand for EVA when compared to the risks of glass shards inside the vehicle.

Speaking only from the armchair of course:

The sort of clumsy tasks, with tools, performed during EVA / while suited, might increase the degree or occurrence of large impacts. (I’m struck - no pun intended- by the engineer Regan’s comments regarding how many chronograph pushers were bent or broken by the astronauts .)

Also, space debris, micrometeorites, and the like are a risk during EVAs not applicable during IVA.

Lastly, that NASA memo I posted, contains a paragraph basically explaining that EVA risks are IVA risks because the damaged materials are returned to the vehicle.

“EVA Hazards
… If a tool strikes a piece of glass during an EVA, and shards are released, there are potential sharp edge hazards to the EVA crew, and also contamination hazards for the IVA crew once the EVA is complete and the contaminated suits are stowed in the airlock. To address this risk, NASA has defined the tool impact environment in the EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, JSC-28918, table 4-7, and hardware providers are required to show that fragments larger than 50 microns are not released by a tool impact event….

Although this is not strictly a “containment” issue, the ultimate hazard is the same – contamination of the habitable environment by fragments of shatterable materials. Controls available to the hardware provider include designing the equipment so that the shatterable materials are protected from tool impact (grids or screens), designating a mass limit on the tools and equipment brought near the hardware during the EVA, or specifying a keep-out zone for their hardware. Verification of the tool impact capability of a piece of shatterable material is usually achieved by an impact test.”

Omegafanman

It’s a shame they did not develop a test for that element so we could retrospectively trial a Sapphire version.

Like you, I’d have thought even the earliest tests to have maybe included an impact test. (The more contemporary memos I’ve posted would more strongly suggest such impact tests are addressed today - note above the 50micron testing spec for hardware?)

Though, I also would love a materials science sort of person to weigh in on whether any of the other tests give any indirect information? Does heating/cooling a material to both +\- 250 degrees suggest anything about frangibility? Or, what’s the resonance frequency of mineral or sapphire glass at the time, because “130dB over a frequency range from 40 to 10,000 HZ, for a duration of 30 minutes” would break a lot of types of glass.

Or instead maybe, in 1964 at least, it may have been clear enough the relative frangibility of plexi vs then-available mineral or sapphire crystals? It sure seems like I n 1964 “shatterproof” was, in the context of watches, a synonym for plexi - like they didn’t need to test alternatives, it was built in the specs?

Edited: Apr 11, 2022

 

[Omegafanman]

cvalue13

Speaking only from the armchair of course:
Or instead maybe, in 1964 at least, it may have been clear enough the relative frangibility of plexi vs then-available mineral or sapphire crystals? It sure seems like I n 1964 “shatterproof” was, in the context of watches, a synonym for plexi - like they didn’t need to test alternatives, it was built in the specs?

Thanks for the reply which all makes sense. I can see how returning to a pressurised atmosphere could disturb more particles from a damaged item (not to mention the process of removing and stowing the EVA suit). I guess similar logic could be used for launch and landing given the vibration and potentially violent movements. Based on the new documentation you have posted I would say your quote above sums it up, and it is now proven that the hesalite was an untested factor in the selection process. I applaud your efforts and it is nice to see a definitive answer. If you are able to get any of the extra info or clarifications previously mentioned that will also be a fantastic addition to the story.

Of course that was nearly 60 years ago and screen / screen protection technology has moved in a lot. It is clear sapphire glass is the material of choice for most modern watches has become accepted in use for IVA. We also don’t yet know the details for the approved Omega X33 ESA tests. There also does not seem to be any sanction if a Sapphire crystal sneaks out for an EVA. I think this evolution of approved flight materials will be a final rabbit hole to close down. Maybe we can push the Hesalite speedie front and centre again for EVA and launches (the only flight approved watch for good reason ;0)
.

 

[padders]

I was under the impression that the x-33 was unsuitable and unauthorised for EVA due to the LCD display which would boil off if exposed to the vacuum of space. The design is only 3 bar rated like the earlier Moonwatches so presumably would risk decompression to a certain degree. This is less of an issuer with a mechanical watch AFAIK.

 

[Omegafanman]

padders

I was under the impression that the x-33 was unsuitable and unauthorised for EVA due to the LCD display which would boil off if exposed to the vacuum of space. The design is only 3 bar rated like the earlier Moonwatches so presumably would risk decompression to a certain degree. This is less of an issuer with a mechanical watch AFAIK.

Yes that is also my understanding. In this case it is just the only example of a Sapphire crystal developed and fully approved for IVA (noting the majority of personal preference watches used for IVA also have Sapphire crystals). Would be interesting to see what the impact resistance and debris material size limitations are (if considered) for the X-33 spec and tests which led to that approval.

 

[cvalue13]

Omegafanman

Of course that was nearly 60 years ago and screen / screen protection technology has moved in a lot.

Screen protection technology?

In the 1960’s Cernan had none:




By the 1980’s, screen protection technology had advanced considerably to scotch tape




While a bit of fun, I also post these pictures here as some indication of the hell to which suit-external watches appear to be put through. Between photos like these, and stories such as Regan’s comments about regularly bent and broken pushers, etc., one can start to develop a picture of the relevance of crystal choice.

I can’t find it at the moment, but I elsewhere saw Regan discussing the extent to which these space-flown watches would require repairs upon return.

One other thing:

While most of our discussions have surround the issue of free-floating debris being a safety hazard to crew and other hardware, the frangibility issue should also be considered regarding the operation of the watch itself.

It seems possible that shards of crystal on the dial side of the watch (i.e., under the crystal) could cause the time or chronograph hands to become jammed or damaged during flight or an EVA, when presumably the importance of the watch’s accuracy is at peak.

 

[Omegafanman]

@cvalue13

Yes it does all get a bit make do and mend. This is my photo of the 207 day MIR Omega. I bet is still runs (well maybe :0)
I guess it still leaves the open question of what changed as modern Sapphire crystal watches are now common place in space and the X33 is approved for use. Of course that still leaves the Speedy Hesalite as the only EVA approved watch (and possibly the only watch truly approved for over- cuff launch and re-entry) of course if there is no embargo for such use (we have seen a Pam on EVA thanks to @SpeedyPhill) it does make me wonder has the risk assessment changed and or is the material spec of a modern Sapphire watch sufficient to overcome any concerns. In 60 years I am not aware of a wristwatch creating an incident.
.

 

[SlCKB0Y]

Omegafanman

I guess it still leaves the open question of what changed as modern Sapphire crystal watches are now common place in space and the X33 is approved for use….it does make me wonder has the risk assessment changed and or is the material spec of a modern Sapphire watch sufficient to overcome any concerns.

Everyone has gotten really focussed on the minutiae and I think it’s probably useful to put things into context at a level high level to help understand how relatively minor decisions were made. Almost everything has changed in the time between the early pioneering space flights and eventual lunar missions compared to the current times of routine government flights and now corporate/civilian space flight.

1. The actual (and perceived) risk profile of space flight itself has completely changed over that time period.

2. Early on, the margins for error were much smaller, resulting in almost zero appetite for foreseeable/avoidable risks rather than accepting and/or mitigating risks.

3. Early on, there were many unknowns, especially as to how certain objects or materials would behave in space due to much less sophisticated capability to use simulation or modelling to get truly accurate answers.

4. An awful lot of knowledge was acquired by experimentation.

Now apply this to your own statement regarding the fact that no major incident has resulted from the material of the watch crystal throughout all of the space missions to your knowledge. This risk was an unknown at the start, and so they went with the safest option which was a “shatter proof” crystal. Given the list of other requirements for the watch, in 1965 that realistically meant plexi and not mineral.

Many missions later with no Watch crystal related incidents, they developed an understanding of the actual risks associated with the choice of material by experience, which proved to be negligible, so they relaxed their requirements.

This kind of acquired, iterative evolution of their understanding of risk related to every object or material that had seen space flight informed their later decision making and risk assessments,

This is just my take on it

 

[SpeedyPhill]

In any way, here's a fun fact:
When Belgian artist Paul Van Hoeydonck presented his original artwork-figurine it represented a human figure in a blue plexiglas tube... it was meant to show mankind going up into the dark blue sky and further in the darkness of space.
However, NASA got back to him as plexiglass was not allowed and he had to alter the design, so no plexiglass was used and only the human figurine remained, which was renamed the " Fallen Astronaut " and carried in the leg pocket of Apollo 15 commander David Scott... who put it on the Lunar surface near the parking spot of the first LRV - Lunar Roving Vehicle used on the Moon (Hadley Rille).
Probably the original block of plexiglass constituted a fire hazard...
Here's a spare " Fallen Astronaut " I'm holding in my hand during a visit to the atelier of this amazing artist who' still going strong at 95 ! ! !
. (Photo: MoonwatchUniverse)

 

[M'Bob]

Gents: as pointed out somewhere above by @cvalue13, Omega was already in the process of modifying the flat-lug case to offer more protection to the crown and pushers, apparently in advance of NASA’s request. Does anyone know of Omega’s decision to do this was at all related to space activities, or simply the result of customer feedback?

 

[cvalue13]

M'Bob

Does anyone know of Omega’s decision to do this was at all related to space activities, or simply the result of customer feedback?

Sorry I can’t say with any authority, but to instead retreat to inference until someone else with better info comes along:

On one hand it stands to reason, and seems suggested by Regan’s phrasing, that Omega was independently doing this work before Regan first broached the issue/topic. Stands to reason Omega was seeing more than just astronauts bending or breaking pushers.

On the other hand, Regan does also say that after every mission he sent all the watches to Omega for repair and service (and that he would only let Omega repair/service). So if NASA was so regularly sending back broken/bent pushers, I’d guess Omega took particular notice of its greatest marketing relationship’s experiences?

Keenly interested in other intel as to the timing and specific decision triggers for the asymmetric case.

 

[SpeedyPhill]

@M'Bob
Indeed it was already planned and had nothing to do with spaceflight

 

[cvalue13]

Meanwhile, on the point of the NASA / ISS prerogative on materials selection, I thought this excerpt from the following book was interesting (though contradictory)

 

[Omegafanman]

S SlCKB0Y

Everyone has gotten really focussed on the minutiae and I think it’s probably useful to put things into context at a level high level to help understand how relatively minor decisions were made. Almost everything has changed in the time between the early pioneering space flights and eventual lunar missions compared to the current times of routine government flights and now corporate/civilian space flight.

1. The actual (and perceived) risk profile of space flight itself has completely changed over that time period.

2. Early on, the margins for error were much smaller, resulting in almost zero appetite for foreseeable/avoidable risks rather than accepting and/or mitigating risks.

3. Early on, there were many unknowns, especially as to how certain objects or materials would behave in space due to much less sophisticated capability to use simulation or modelling to get truly accurate answers.

4. An awful lot of knowledge was acquired by experimentation.

Now apply this to your own statement regarding the fact that no major incident has resulted from the material of the watch crystal throughout all of the space missions to your knowledge. This risk was an unknown at the start, and so they went with the safest option which was a “shatter proof” crystal. Given the list of other requirements for the watch, in 1965 that realistically meant plexi and not mineral.

Many missions later with no Watch crystal related incidents, they developed an understanding of the actual risks associated with the choice of material by experience, which proved to be negligible, so they relaxed their requirements.

This kind of acquired, iterative evolution of their understanding of risk related to every object or material that had seen space flight informed their later decision making and risk assessments,

This is just my take on it

I totally get it is an iterative / incremental and evolving process. The beauty of standards, risk assessments and specifications is that you can normally track the evolution and mark the design changes. Something has changed to allow Sapphire crystal but we don’t know exactly what or why.
As per the quote highlighted from @cvalue13 we are left with a contradiction… and a contradiction usually means you are missing some facts. Really we need a test spec for the X33 / current risk assessments for wristwatches in terms of material specs for IVA and EVA.

cvalue13

Meanwhile, on the point of the NASA / ISS prerogative on materials selection, I thought this excerpt from the following book was interesting (though contradictory)

 

[cvalue13]

Omegafanman

Something has changed to allow Sapphire crystal but we don’t know exactly what or why.

Attempting to get some bearing as to what missing facts we could be looking for:

(1) I don’t think anything has changed as recent as the X-33

It may be misleading to think the X-33 development-approval holds much of a key in understanding NASA’s thinking around the plexi vs sapphire issue. Long before X-33, NASA had sanctioned the existence of sapphire crystal watches for IVA.

While NASA did not issue a sapphire watch, the astronauts personal belongings (as I understand it) are still yet subject to NASA’s review and approval and subject to similar safety filters. Makes sense.

Accordingly, from a risk perspective, NASA had ‘approved’ of sapphire crystal watches during IVA long before the X-33, even if NASA didn’t itself issue a sapphire crystal watch until the X-33.

Therefore, if looking for some timeline as to when NASA had any potential change of risk assessment, we might instead look for when the first known sapphire crystal personal watch was brought aboard. (While I suppose there’s some theoretical risk it was brought aboard without NASA’s approval, I think it will still start to better hone us in on a relevant timeline, if one exists at all.)


2. We may want to consider as relevant not merely the distinction between EVA and IVA, but also the distinction between missions with a lunar landing and later missions without any lunar landing.

In researching about airborne contaminant related safety, I’ve come across fairly extensive discussions about an issue faced by lunar missions: moon dust and rocks. These guys were apparently absolutely covered in the stuff, suit pockets filled with it, and skin caked in it. And then the IVA’s were plagued by the stuff.

How is this relevant to NASA’s view of the materials selection of their issued wristwatches? No clue.

But I can’t help but put on the metaphorical ‘white board’ that something about NASA’s learning experiences regarding airborn contaminates after lunar missions may have impacted their risk philosophy regarding non-lunar missions.

So, if only to not miss a relevant distinctions, we might keep in mind not only the differences between EVA and IVA, but also lunar vs non-lunar missions as being potentially pertinent to NASA’s airborne contaminant safety views.

At the bottom I post some info about the Apollo lunar dust issues that gives some insight into what airborn contaminant issues in zero-G look like.

3. NASA requalified the Speedmaster again in ~72 and then in ~78, again considering several other watches. They similarly issued a SOS to many manufacturers (16 in 72), with those specs I know being different that the SOS in ‘68, but that I’ve never seen.

(I know it was at least different because it contained parameters around the ‘Buy American’ act, which famously lead to a dust-up with Bulova threatening legal action for what they felt was shenanigans by NASA and Omega in connection with the selection process.)

I have seen the testing parameters for that ~72 requalification, but never the statement of specifications. I don’t know that I’ve seen anything for ‘78? But these specs might be telling, at that point in the development of the shuttle program, combined with the broader existence of sapphire (as opposed to mineral) crystal on the market, as well as by that point NASA’s regular approval of personal watches with sapphire for IVA purposes (e.g., surely by ~1978 more than a few sapphire watches had gone up?).



For fun, here’s a link to a 2008 NASA presentation regarding lessons learned about lunar dust (as relevant to future plans for lunar or Mars missions) - but for posterity incouding some most relevant slides below

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20170009133/downloads/20170009133.pdf?attachment=true

Edited: Apr 15, 2022

 

[cvalue13]

Speaking of lunar dust and watches…