2025 sales (Swiss Brands)

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The constellation line is pretty bad too. So little of the heritage is available, to the point that the globemaster is basically the only 'good' looking not-special-release version.


TBH, the Moonswatch helped Omega a ton, and history will show that it got a ton of folks (myself included!) into the brand.

I like the variety as well, there is something for everyone. It seems to me that it would cut on PROFITS, but not sales. Do we really think people are going into the AD, saying "boy, I love that watch there, but there is ALSO a blue and a green one, so I'm going to buy a Rolex instead"?.
I like the variety to a certain extent. They do it well with some lines, but not others. I don't agree that there is always something for everyone. I'll use the Diver 300M, and Aqua Terra as examples. The AT line is done well. I can get the same watch in multiple different case sizes. If I want a black dial, steel AT on a bracelet, I have four different case sizes to choose from.

If I want the Diver I have one case size (I'm not including the chrono or other unique versions) I can pick from. A quick glance at the website shows 46 different versions. Every single one the same case size.

The 42 mm Diver case just does not work for my wrist. The AT 38 mm does, but unfortunately I'm not in the market for AT. Would love a new Diver though. Just not at 42 mm.
 
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I'm not a Swatch Group investor so I don't care. If Omega makes watches I like and want, I buy them. If they don't, I don't buy them. Rankings mean nothing to me.
 
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When you dig into that Morgan Stanley report, it becomes clear why Omega is under pressure. The Swiss watch industry is experiencing the same kind of “K-shaped” split seen across the broader economy, where growth is increasingly concentrated among a smaller, ultra-wealthy customer base. The report notes that watches priced above CHF 50,000 (roughly $65,000) represented only about 1.4% of total export volume in 2025, yet accounted for approximately 37% of total export value. In other words, the real money is being made at the very top. It’s no surprise, then, that brands like Patek Philippe, Audemars Piguet, and Richard Mille are generating outsized revenue on production numbers that are a fraction of Omega’s. It also explains why Rolex continues to push precious metal references so aggressively—gold and platinum models carry materially higher margins than stainless steel, and that’s where the profit leverage now sits.

Omega is in a particularly difficult position within this market dynamic because it is effectively the largest player competing for what remains of the traditional Swiss watch market once the ultra-wealthy segment is carved out. At the same time, Omega suffers from brand diffusion: it is trying to be everything to everyone. It has stretched its catalog across too many price tiers, styles, and narratives, blurring what the brand actually stands for. In chasing the broad “aspirational but not ultra-wealthy” buyer, it has failed to present a sharply defined identity, leaving the mid-luxury segment increasingly vulnerable to competitors with tighter positioning. Tudor has claimed the modern tool-watch value story, Breitling has refocused on aviation-heritage sport watches, and IWC has leaned into clean, masculine engineering aesthetics. By contrast, Omega feels scattered, simultaneously luxury, entry luxury, heritage, fashion, space, Bond, Olympics, vintage, and innovation, resulting in weaker brand clarity and less urgency for buyers choosing among similarly priced alternatives.